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Most studies of political action committees (PACs) focus on the incumbent-oriented contribution
strategies of PACs, whereas contributions to open-seat candidates remain relatively unexplored.
Based on the assumption that open-seat candidates have an insatiable need for campaign money,
we model the allocations of PACs to open-seat senate candidates from 1980 to 1994. The results
of our analyses indicate that allocations in open-seat senate elections are more partisan than those
in incumbent elections, although incumbent-like effects are evident in allocations by corporate, labor,
and trade association PACs, which largely support aspirant House of Representatives members who
have previously existing connections to monied interests. Unlike the bipartisan behavior exhibited
by investor PACs in open house races, labor and investor interests reinforce the partisan divisions
in senate contests by engaging in competitive funding of opposing candidates.
Only recently has research on congressional elections turned to
examine open-seat contests. The study of open seats has focused
exclusively on House of Representatives races (Gaddie 1995b;
Flemming 1995; Mondak 1993), and there is only one study on the
financing of open-seat candidates (Gaddie 1995a). Senate open seats
have been virtually ignored in political science research. Only one
study has treated open-seat senate elections as a distinct category of
election, and that treatment is cursory at best (Abramowitz and Segal
1992). A component of the inattention paid to open-seat senate elec-
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tions is the lack of research on the financing of open-seat senate
candidacies. Like house members, senators are more likely to initially
gain office in open seats. The dramatic increase in senate retirements
in the 1990s and the corresponding increase in open-seat contests
mean that incumbent influences are structuring fewer senate cam-
paigns. Therefore, an examination of how economic interests relate to
nonincumbent senate candidates is warranted.
In this brief note, we examine the allocations by economic interests
to open-seat senate candidates. If we assume that economic interests
are more concerned about policy outputs than about influencing the
partisan outcomes of individual elections per se, then interests will
pursue allocation strategies that maximize the likelihood of obtaining
institutional access and influence (Regens and Gaddie 1995; Grier,
Munger, and Torrent 1990). Pragmatic economic interests will con-
tribute to the likely winners, who usually are the incumbents. The
certainty associated with incumbent elections is not an issue in most
open-seat contests. Given the power and visibility accrued to senators
as well as the relatively few senate seats available, organized interests
should offer ample support to open-seat contestants. In the absence of
incumbency cues, do political action committees (PACs) pursue con-
tribution strategies that support both parties’ candidates-an extension
of the bipartisan relationship between private-sector interests and
incumbents-or do PACs demonstrate partisan behavior that empha-
sizes the classic business-labor allegiances of the respective parties?
In this study, we examine the campaign allocations of three major
PAC cohorts that possess clearly defined economic interests: corpo-
rations, trade associations, and labor unions’ (Grier, Munger, and
Torrent 1990; Snyder 1990). We present descriptive evidence on the
variation in receipts by candidate party and category of PAC, and we
specify and test multivariate models designed to identify the major
influences on PAC allocations to open-seat candidates.
ECONOMIC POLITICAL ACTION
COMMITTEES AND OPEN SEATS
Assessing the effect of spending on congressional election out-
comes has been one of the more intriguing problems addressed by
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political scientists and economists. In the Senate, the problems of
sufficient data points and inequities across constituencies have
plagued prior attempts to obtain meaningful results.2 Scholars who
have explored the effect of campaign spending on senate election
outcomes have found that the party that is able to seize the spending
advantage is assumed to benefit from the additional spending (Regens
and Gaddie 1995; Abramowitz and Segal 1992; Campbell and Sumners
1990). Further analysis of senate incumbent fund-raising reveals that
legislator attributes such as ideology and electoral vulnerability struc-
ture the financial contributions of monied interests across levels of
analysis (Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990; Regens, Gaddie, and Elliott
1994) and that heavy reliance on PAC support precedes heavy fund-
raising and spending by incumbents (Regens and Gaddie 1995).
The largest source of campaign money in senate campaigns is
individuals, followed by PACs and then by the parties (Regens and
Gaddie 1995; Jacobson 1989). Among PACs, the vast bulk of money
is provided by committees that represent groups with primarily eco-
nomic concerns--corporations, professional trade associations and
health maintenance organizations, and labor unions. These groups
historically have aligned themselves behind the major parties, with
corporate and trade groups supporting the GOP and labor backing the
Democrats. However, there is ample evidence that these partisan
alignments are fluid and subject to other influences that cause interests,
especially private-sector ones, to cross partisan and ideological lines
when engaging in political action. Starting in 1982, corporate and trade
PAC allocations shifted from a partisan, ideological strategy support-
ing Republican candidates to a bipartisan, bet-covering strategy that
emphasized incumbents (Su, Neustadtl, and Clawson 1995; Gaddie
1996). A candidate for election would be best advantaged when
philosophically similar PACs follow partisan, ideological cues while
PACs more attuned to the opponent’s party respond to incentives to
cover bets or otherwise defect from ideological loyalty. In the
House, this shift worked to the advantage of Democrats running as
incumbents and also benefited Democrats in open seats (Gaddie
1995a).
Prior research indicates that the practice of contributing to candi-
dates has followed one of two strategies: to pursue electoral goals or
to gain access to lawmakers (Wright 1989; Denzau and Munger 1986).
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA LIBRARIES on January 20, 2016apr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
350
Benefit-seeking interests will attempt to alter government to obtain
benefits, either by changing the composition of government or by
influencing the incumbent government to produce selective benefits.
Incumbency-influence models dominate the literature on campaign
finance, and monied interests are assumed to make allocations based
on strategies to influence or access legislators (Wright 1989).~ The
only study that explicitly examines the funding of open seats finds
several factors that influence the funding decisions of economic
interests (Gaddie 1995a). Based on the results of that analysis of open
house races, we expect the following:
1. Economic PACs act in their own best interest. They pursue pragmatic
contribution strategies to further their economic needs, which are
predicated on not facing a hostile legislature. Therefore, they will seek
to create linkages with potential legislators, and in so doing they will
attempt to reduce the uncertainty in their investment by seeking cues
to likely winners.
2. Candidates who have higher potential election costs aggressively seek
PAC money. Given the high costs of a senate campaign (the average
cost of an open-seat race between 1980 and 1994 was more than $3
million in constant 1994 dollars), open-seat senate candidates should
be especially aggressive in seeking support from monied interests.
3. Parties have a sense of the value of their candidates, and economic
PACs invest based on party appraisals of candidates. The investment
by parties in nonincumbent candidates serves as a proxy for the value
of the candidacy to the party.4 Interests will use party investment as a
cue to candidate quality (Fowler and McClure 1989).
4. Private economic interests engage in trade-off contribution activity
that is detrimental to Republican candidates. Research in house races
indicates that, as the investment in a candidate increases, there is a
corresponding falloff in support for the candidate’s opponent (Gaddie
1995a). However, the falloff is far greater for Republicans than for
Democrats. Regens, Gaddie, and Elliott (1994) find that incumbent
senators receive less support from polluting corporations when those
firms invested more heavily in their opponents, indicating that such
effects could be evident in open senate races.
To ascertain significance of signals received by PACs in determining
allocated support, we examine the influence of four sets of variables
on economic PAC allocations in open-seat senate elections.
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PARTY EFFECTS
Research on the allocations by PACs to incumbent senators indi-
cates that a strong partisan component exists in giving by corporate,
trade, and labor PACs (Regens and Gaddie 1995; Grier, Munger, and
Torrent 1990). In open seats, we expect contribution patterns to be
even more partisan, with labor exclusively preferring Democrats and
with corporate and trade PACs more heavily supporting Republicans.
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 reinforce this assumption. Corpo-
rate and labor PACs demonstrated highly partisan allocation strategies
in open-seat senate races. The ratio of Republican:Democratic receipts
in open seats was approximately 4:1 from corporations, while Demo-
crats enjoyed a 25:1 receipt advantage from labor. Average trade
association contributions to candidates ran about 2:1 to the advantage
of Republicans. Overall, economic PACs gave about $250,000 more
on average (in constant 1994 dollars) to Republicans than to Demo-
crats. By comparison, the balance of moneys from economic PACs
split slightly to the Democratic advantage in open house seats during
the same time period. In the multivariate analyses, candidates are
separated by party to avoid potential double counting and simultane-
ous causation problems in the analysis.
Party organization behavior also has been important in determining
the level of economic PAC investment in candidates. Fowler and
McClure (1989) ascribe a gatekeeper role to the parties, indicating that
the receipt of PAC money by nonincumbents was contingent on party
endorsement or support for the candidates. Gaddie (1995a) finds that
party investments in open-seat house candidates are a significant
predictor of economic PAC support. There is a critical difference in
the rules governing party investment in senate candidates versus
support for house candidates. Under the Federal Election Campaign
Act amendments, the parties are constrained in their giving to candi-
dates by contribution ceilings. These ceilings for party support are a
constant for house candidates but vary by population for senate
candidates. Senate spending caps are developed using a per capita
spending formula, and population is the overwhelming predictor of
party support to the open-seat candidates under study.s To assess the
weight of party importance ascribed to a candidacy, we measure party
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TABLE 1
PAC Contributions to Open-Seat Senate Candidates, 1980-1994
SOURCE: Federal Election Commission data releases, 1980-1994 (Candidate Crosstab files).
All financial data are expressed in constant 1994 dollars (43 Democrats, 43 Republicans).
NOTE: Standard deviations are in parentheses. PAC = political action committee.
a. From all PAC, individual, and party sources.
investment as the per capita support afforded the candidate. This
measure also allows us to test independently for the effects of
population.
CONSTITUENCY EFFECTS
State population size should relate to the amount of money allocated
to open-seat senate candidates. Population effects are evident in
incumbent senate campaign expenditures as well as in the contribution
strategies of economic interests to incumbents (Squire 1991). Regens
and Gaddie (1995) find that corporate PACs give more heavily to
senate incumbents from larger states but find no evidence that trade
association or labor union contributions were related to constituency
size. It is reasonable to expect similar trends in open-seat races. To
capture population effects, we include a measure of state population.
Economic PACs have demonstrated unique behavior toward south-
ern candidates. Gaddie (1995a) finds that corporate and trade PACs
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have invested more heavily in southern Democrats, while labor PACs
tend to eschew southerners in general. Gaddie (1996) also observes
that corporate PACs give more heavily to southern Democratic incum-
bents. We expect trade and corporate PACs to give more heavily to
southern Democrats and Republicans, whereas labor will give signifi-
cantly less to southern Democrats.6 6
CANDIDATE POLITICAL EXPERIENCE
Candidate political experience should influence the level of support
obtained from PACs. Candidates with previous political experience
bring existing connections or relationships with monied interests and
may possess greater fund-raising experience than do amateur candi-
dates. A substantial body of research has tied political experience to
senate challenger performance (Lublin 1994; Squire 1991), and expe-
rience is a significant indicator of open-seat house election outcomes
(Gaddie 1995b; Bond and Fleisher 1991). Gaddie’s (1995a) analysis
of economic PAC allocations in open house races indicates that
experience structures candidate receipts, with highly experienced
candidates benefiting from the attention of economic interests. In-
dexes of political experience often rank order various officeholding
experiences into cardinal scales and impose an incremental value on
levels of experience.’ To better control for the impact of experience
on fund-raising, we use a pair of dichotomous variables to indicate
whether the candidate is a governor or a U.S. representative. Testing
for experience effects in this manner allows us to control for the
distinct public profile and extensive contacts that these candidates
bring to campaigns. Representatives should be advantaged in eco-
nomic PAC fund-raising because of their preexisting contacts inside
the beltway as well as their ability to affect federal policy in the near
term.
TRADE-OFF AND ARMS-RACE EFFECTS
As we already noted, one of the principal controversies in economic
PAC behavior has been the shifting allocation patterns by what Snyder
(1990) terms &dquo;investor PACs&dquo; (i.e., corporations and trade associa-
tions) away from partisan Republican allocations and toward a prag-
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matic, incumbent-oriented strategy that leaves GOP challengers woe-
fully underfunded; this shift also is evident in corporate and trade
contributions in open house seats (Gaddie 1995a, 1996; Su, Neustadtl,
and Clawson 1995). A component of this shift in house elections is
the creation of trade-offs in funding that are more detrimental to
Republican candidate fund-raising. To determine whether similar
effects are evident in senate contests, we control for the opponent’s
receipts from the same PACs.8
Given the issue-oriented, ideological nature of senate races
(Abramowitz and Segal 1992), it is possible that &dquo;arms-race&dquo;9 effects
may be evident in open-seat senate campaigns; labor PACs will give
to Democrats who are opposed by Republicans receiving substantial
investor PAC support, and trade and corporate PACs will give more
heavily to Republicans who oppose Democrats supported with sub-
stantial labor money. The presence of financial patterns that align
investor PACs against labor clearly will differentiate PAC behavior in
open senate races from the patterns observed in open house seats.’o
DEPENDENT VARIABLES AND MULTIVARIATE METHODS
The dependent variables are the receipts by open-seat candidates
from corporate, trade, and labor PACs, expressed in constant 1994
dollars. Data are obtained for the 86 candidates in 43 open senate seats
that occurred between 1980 to 1994. To test our assumptions about
PAC allocations in open-seat elections, two forms of regression analy-
sis are used to estimate the receipts by candidates: ordinary least
squares regression (OLS) and Tobit analysis. Because the dependent
variable is truncated at 0 on the left side of the distribution, the
potential exists for bias in the OLS estimates. Tobit analysis corrects
for this truncation and estimates the relationships between the inde-
pendent and limited dependent variables while correcting for the
left-hand censoring of the dependent variable (Maddala 1983; Tobin
1958). Of the six dependent variables analyzed, only one (Republican
receipts from labor PACs) is skewed with more than 10% of cases
being coded 0.11 We are confident in the validity of the OLS results for
the other five analyses; we present the Tobit analyses as a check on
the OLS estimates.&dquo;
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA LIBRARIES on January 20, 2016apr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
355
RESULTS
The results of the analysis appear in Table 2.13 The specified
equations reduce the unexplained variance by 25% to 50%, and the fit
of the Tobit analyses and the OLS regression estimates are consistent
across models. Furthermore, the level of significance and the direction
of the indicator variables are consistent between the OLS and Tobit
models, with one exception: The population variable just misses
significance in the OLS estimates of Democratic labor receipts but is
statistically significant in the Tobit analysis. The regression analyses
indicate that allocations by economic PACs are highly partisan in
nature. Contributions are consistently structured by candidate experi-
ence and political variables that indicate confrontations of labor and
investor PACs.
Separating the effects of political experience reveals the relative
importance of congressional and executive experience in gaining PAC
support. Among Democrats, governors and representatives receive
significantly more support than do other candidates from corporate
and trade PACs, whereas Republican governors do not receive signifi-
cantly more corporate or trade support. The coefficient for governors
is not significant in the labor PAC analyses for either party.
There are significant trade-off and arms-race effects in open-seat
senate races. Trade-off effects are apparent in contributions to Repub-
lican candidates by corporate and trade PACs. The OLS estimates
indicate that these reductions are substantial-a loss of almost 70 cents
in corporate money to the GOP candidate per investor PAC dollar
given to the Democratic candidate and a loss of 25 cents on the dollar
in trade money. No significant trade-off effects are observed in Demo-
cratic receipts. The arms-race effects advanced in our model emerge
in the empirical analysis. Democrats receive significantly more sup-
port from labor when the Republican opponents are heavily funded by
investor PACs. Corporate and trade support of GOP candidates simi-
larly responds to increased support of Democrats. The magnitude of
the corporate and trade PAC responses is greater than that of the labor
PAC response ((3 = 1.46 for corporate response, fi = 0.34 for trade
response, (3 = 0.14 for labor response to investor PAC allocations to
GOP candidates).
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The investment by the parties is not significantly related to the
receipt of money from all of the PAC cohorts examined, and signifi-
cant population effects are apparent only in the receipt of labor money
by Democrats. Although labor gives almost exclusively to Democrats,
this result indicates that, when giving to Democrats, labor discrimi-
nates based on the need of candidates to reach more voters. Also, the
greater interest of investor PACs in southern races is evident in this
analysis. Southern Democrats receive significantly more money from
corporate and trade PACs than do other Democratic candidates, and
southern Republicans receive greater support from corporate PACs
than do other GOP senate aspirants. It is interesting that the signifi-
cantly lower level of labor support afforded to southern Democrats in
open house seats is not observed in senate races for the same time
period.
CONCLUSIONS
Unlike candidates for open house seats, senate open-seat candidates
often hold highly visible, politically powerful elective positions when
seeking the Senate. And, more so than in open house elections,
candidates’ possession of those positions structures the political action
of economic interests in open senate elections. For example, as incum-
bents, house members are positioned to extract financial assets from
organized economic interests at levels normally reserved for incum-
bent senators (Regens and Gaddie 1995; Parker 1992). Although it is
not surprising that house incumbents exploit their institutional posi-
tion, it is somewhat surprising that, in an electoral context that affords
nominees high visibility, the magnitude and significance of house
experience is so pronounced.
Among experienced candidates, U.S. representatives exist in an
environment that encourages the development of intimate relation-
ships that are based on political power and mutual needs of legislators
and interest groups. Representatives extend those relationships to
gamer support while seeking higher office. Of the 86 candidates in
this study, 40 (46.5%) were U.S. representatives. The plurality of
candidates nominated for Senate office possess prior congressional
experience that enhances their ability to obtain campaign support from
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interests that normally direct their political activity exclusively toward
incumbents.
When governments and voters undertake policy proposals such as
term limits, they should be advised that such proposals may not result
in the consequence intended by reformers. Term limits overturn in-
cumbents and create open seats. Those candidates who are best
equipped and connected to aspire to the Senate-governors and espe-
cially representatives-draw on their incumbency linkages in open
seats. PACs are attracted to candidates with whom they have pre-
viously existing relationships, and these legislators and executives
exploit their previously established relationships when seeking to
move to higher office. However, those interest groups that provide this
largesse are not craven entities that are held hostage to the financial
needs of well-connected candidates. Investor PACs and labor PACs
respond to the political machinations of each other in a fashion that
reinforces the partisan ties of labor PACs and investor PACs to the
Democratic and Republican parties, respectively. This arms-race be-
havior is a principal difference between house and senate elections. In
open house contests, Democrats are able to benefit from the political
behavior of economic interests that transcended parties and muddy the
boundaries that traditionally divided corporate and labor support of
candidates. In senate races, the same interests during the same time
period reinforce the partisan divisions in financially competitive races.
The results of this analysis may be confined to the era under study,
and the small number of cases may limit our ability to generalize from
the results of the analysis. However, the robust nature of our results
indicates support for our hypotheses. The use of power cues by monied
interests when allocating campaign funds is indicative of a political
system that emphasizes quasi-incumbent attributes. The fact that those
cues structure giving in the absence of incumbents indicates that there
is a limit to congressional reforms that constrains incumbents without
addressing the financing of congressional elections.
NOTES
1. A fourth economic PAC cohort, cooperative PACs, is excluded from this analysis. The
PACs m this small cohort are predominantly affiliated with agricultural cooperatives, and they
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have a highly focused contribution strategy that almost exclusively emphasizes the members of
the agriculture committees in the House and Senate (Regens and Gaddie 1995; Grier, Munger,
and Torrent 1990).
2. In the Senate, degrees of freedom problems previously have precluded the study of open
seats; instead, studies of senate elections usually pool open seats with incumbent seats and then
introduce various controls for incumbency (Campbell and Sumners 1990).
3. Empirical studies find that PACs respond to committee assignments of individual
members, electoral vulnerability of incumbents, and ideologically extreme legislators when
allocating campaign support (Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990).
4. The parties, especially the Democrats, have limited assets to direct to their candidates
and are somewhat selective in their investments.
5. Population explains virtually all of the variance in party allocations to open-seat senate
candidates (adjusted R2= .99).
6. For our purposes, the South is the 11 secession states; the variable is coded 1 for southern
states and 0 otherwise.
7. Lublin (1994) observes that these scales often erroneously place statewide office-
holding experience over congressional experience (e.g., the Squire [1991] index). Based on
the use of dummy controls for different forms of experience, Lublin’s 4-point index recon-
stitutes the rank order and ascribes the greatest experience value to house representatives,
then to governors, and then to other officeholders. Initial analyses in this study suggest that
although the Lublin index is useful in explaining election outcomes, it does not accurately
reflect the relationship between candidate experience and candidate receipts. The cardinal
scale imposed by the index does not reflect the relative valuation placed by economic interests
on different candidates.
8. Initial analyses uncover similar trade-off effects by opponent trade and corporate PAC
receipts on the dependent variables; therefore, we collapse both into one measure (investor PAC
receipts) to save degrees of freedom. Also, GOP candidate receipts from labor PACs do not affect
Democratic receipts; we likewise drop this variable in the final analysis.
9. We acknowledge James Garand’s suggestion of this term.
10. There is a variety of other factors that could conceivably affect economic PAC alloca-
tions such as constituency ideology, the electoral history of the state, or year-specific shifts in
funding. Controls for all of these factors have been introduced into different models in the
conduct of this research, and none of the associated coefficients achieves conventional levels
of statistical significance. We present the most parsimonious models of PAC giving for these
races.
11. Given the skewed nature of Republican candidate receipts from labor PACs, that analysis
initially is estimated using Tobit. Then we also dichotomize the dependent variable (1 = receipt
from labor and 0 otherwise) and estimate the model using logistic regression.
12. We examine variance inflation factors (VIF) to test for potential multicollinearity in the
regression models. No VIF is greater than 2, indicating that multicollinearity is not a serious
problem.
13. The analyses also are conducted with controls for year-specific effects (Stimson 1985).
Those controls are not statistically significant and do not affect the regression outcomes. Given
the relatively few degrees of freedom available in the analysis, the temporal controls are
eliminated to present a more parsimonious model.
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